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Abstract
This article reviews how organisms learn and recognize the world through the dynamics of neural
networks from the perspective of Bayesian inference, and introduces a view on how such dynamics is
described by the laws for the entropy of neural activity, a paradigm that we call thermodynamics of the
Bayesian brain. The Bayesian brain hypothesis sees the stimulus-evoked activity of neurons as an act
of constructing the Bayesian posterior distribution based on the generative model of the external world
that an organism possesses. A closer look at the stimulus-evoked activity at early sensory cortices reveals
that feedforward connections initially mediate the stimulus-response, which is later modulated by input
from recurrent connections. Importantly, not the initial response, but the delayed modulation expresses
animals’ cognitive states such as awareness and attention regarding the stimulus. Using a simple generative
model made of a spiking neural population, we reproduce the stimulus-evoked dynamics with the delayed
feedback modulation as the process of the Bayesian inference that integrates the stimulus evidence and a
prior knowledge with time-delay. We then introduce a thermodynamic view on this process based on the
laws for the entropy of neural activity. This view elucidates that the process of the Bayesian inference
works as the recently-proposed information-theoretic engine (neural engine, an analogue of a heat engine in
thermodynamics), which allows us to quantify the perceptual capacity expressed in the delayed modulation
in terms of entropy.
1 Introduction
Living organisms learn the world, recognize the cur-
rent situation, and then choose their actions for their
survival. These processes are underpinned by the
nonlinear dynamics of the network activity in nervous
systems. Neuronal mechanisms, such as nonlinear
(i.e., thresholding) properties for spike generation, in-
tegration of synaptic inputs at dendrites, and archi-
tecture of network connections, constrain the neural
activity, therefore limit animals’ capacity in recog-
nizing the world. The goal of this article is to pro-
vide a unified Bayesian and thermodynamic view on
these structured neuronal dynmamics involving or-
ganism’s recognition and learning. We review key ex-
perimental observation of neural dynamics that sup-
port the Bayesian view of the learning and recogni-
tion in organisms, and explain that the neural dynam-
ics that performs the Bayesian inference forms the
recently-proposed information-theoretic engine (neu-
ral engine) [1, 2]. We demonstrate that this new
paradigm allows us to quantitatively assess animal’s
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internal computation such as attention or awareness
from neural spike data.
It is thought that the brain is adapted to the
characteristic statistical structure of natural stimuli
to gain the information efficiently. This hypothesis,
known as the efficient coding hypothesis [3, 4], sug-
gests that the sensory systems in organisms attempt
to convey the maximum amount of information of
the external world by eliminating redundancy of ex-
ternal stimuli. The hypothesis is also known as the
information maximization principle (Infomax princi-
ple) [5] that is the optimization principle of the non-
linear responses in nervous systems [6]. For example,
experiments with fly visual cells demonstrated that
the nonlinear response functions of neurons adapted
to the distribution of visual stimuli in the external
world [7]. The hypothesis also also explains emer-
gence of Gabor-like receptive fields of neurons in early
visual systems [5, 8, 9]. It is this process of adapt-
ing nonlinear devices to the distributions of external
signals that we call learning.
The natural environment is not stationary but
continuously changing. Living organisms need to
adapt to (or learn) the time-varying distributions of
sensory inputs; therefore, they have mechanisms to
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1 INTRODUCTION
adapt their nonlinear responses to the changing en-
vironment more quickly than the above-mentioned
learning processes [10]. The gain control, or gain
modulation, is a ubiquitous adaptation mechanism
that shifts or rescales the nonlinear response func-
tion under the new distribution. A typical example
is gain control dealing with the intensity and con-
trast changes in visual stimuli. A visual stimulus
has a dynamic range of 10 to the 9th power, rang-
ing from 10−4 cd/m2 for the blink of a star at night
to 105 cd/m2 for sunlight during the day. Therefore,
it is not easy to directly express the light intensity
using the dynamic range of neurons from 0 Hz to
several hundred heltz. Typically, the responses of
neurons adapted to the dark environment saturate in
the bright environment, resuling in low sensitivity to
the bright light intensity. However, neurons in the
retina and primary visual cortex can respond to a
wide range of light intensities by adapting the non-
linear response function to the new stimulus distri-
bution; phenomena called light adaptation and con-
trast gain control [11, 12, 13, 14]. By this adapta-
tion, the portion of the response function with the
highest rate of change encodes the stimulus inten-
sities/contrasts that most frequently appear. Thus,
neural activity again becomes sensitive to changes in
the stimulus. There are multiple mechanisms that re-
alize light adaptation and contrast gain control, even
in the retina alone.1 Further, the pupillary light re-
flex of pupil diameters regulates the amount of light
projected to the retina. Thus, organisms cope with
changes in the external world through multiple adap-
tation mechanisms and acquire information from the
external world as much as possible.
The gain control is a broad concept describing the
nonlinear interaction of two or more inputs (signal
sources) on a neuronal response [16]. It is the basis of
information integration by the neural systems (non-
linear devices). As will be discussed in this article,
the gain control also explains higher-order brain func-
tions such as attention and coordinate transformation
in visual systems [17]. The “divisive normalization”
that explains various characteristics of the sensory
responses in cortical microcircuitries is also a part of
the gain control. Therefore, not a single mechanism
may be able to explain the variety of phenomena re-
sulting in the gain control. Indeed, researchers pro-
posed multiple mechanisms. Examples are the gain
control realized by changes in the strength of back-
1These mechanisms include depletion of photopigment in
photoreceptors and a shift from one type of photoreceptor (the
rods) to the other (the cones). Also, the contrast gain control is
thought to take place in both bipolar cells and retinal ganglion
cells [15].
ground synaptic inputs [18, 19], shunting inhibition
[20, 21, 22], and synaptic depression [23, 24]. Simi-
larly to the gain control in engineering systems, neu-
ral systems can realize the gain control by either feed-
forward or feedback connections. The sophisticated
cognitive functions achieved by the gain control are
likely to be caused by the feedback inputs from higher
cortical areas. The gain control by feedback modula-
tion should involve dynamics with time-delay.
This article explains how the learning of nonlinear
response functions extend to the process by which
the brain acquires a statistical model of the external
world; the view termed as the Bayesian brain hypoth-
esis. It will be also shown that the Bayesian view of
the stimulus-response provides a statistical paradigm
for the gain control. According to the Bayesian brain
hypothesis, the brain constructs a model of the ex-
ternal world (generative model) that assumes causes
behind the sensory input, and makes inferences about
the causes. The inference is achieved by constructing
a posterior distribution of the causes using this model
according to the Bayes’ theorem. One can immedi-
ately see that the posterior distribution derived from
the genrative model represents stochastic responseses
of neurons with specific nonliear response functions
(see Appendix of this article). The gain control is
realized as changes of the generative model. Furthre-
more, similarly to the learning and gain control of the
nonlinear response functions, the generative model is
learned so that it acquires the distribution of exter-
nal stimuli. In Shimazaki 2019 [25], we’ve seen that
we could describe this adaptive process, once again,
from the information-theoretic perspective as a pro-
cess maximizing the amount of mutual information
between the structure of the nervous system and the
external world via neural activity.
When we consider the information-theoretic prin-
ciples of the recognition and learning by the nervous
systems of an organism, it is necessary to take into
account their dynamics. Neurophysiological stud-
ies on early sensory cortices revealed that an ini-
tial feedforward-sweep of neural response depends on
stimulus features whereas perceptual effect such as
awareness and attention is represented as modula-
tion of the later part of the stimulus-response. As
introduced in this article, some of these experiments
were described precisely in the framework of the gain
control. The delayed modulation is presumably me-
diated by feedback connections from higher brain re-
gions. We show that the delayed gain control of the
stimulus response via recurrent feedback connections
is modeled as a dynamic process of the Bayesian in-
ference that combines the observation and top-down
prior with time-delay.
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Figure 1: A Bayesian view of neural activity
Interestingly, it will be shown that this process be-
comes a mathematical analogue of a heat engine in
thermodynamics. To see this, this article reviews a
thermodynamic approach to the dynamics of learn-
ing and recognition. Here, the thermodynamic ap-
proach refers to describing learning and recognition
by the laws about the entropy of neural activity, us-
ing a model obtained under the maximum entropy
principle. Specifically, we derive the conservation law
of entropy (the first law) for the neural dynamics of
recognition (stimulus-response) and show the condi-
tions under which the law of increasing entropy (the
second law) represents the learning. Based on the
first law, we explain that the neural dynamics that
realizes the Bayesian inference through feedback gain
control behaves analogously to a heat engine. This
view provides us to quantify the amount of the de-
layed gain control and its efficiency in retaining the
stimulus information in terms of entropy changes of
the neural activity. Thus it offers a way to measure
the perceptual capacity of organisms.
The structure of this article is as follows. In Sec-
tion 2, we briefly introduce an interpretation of neu-
ral activity as the one that realizes the Bayesian in-
ference. Next, we review experimental studies that
support this view in Section 3. We eplain how ex-
perimental studies lead to the idea that the brain
constructs a generative model of the external world
(Section 3.1), and investigate details of the stimulus-
evoked neuronal dynamics by reviewing experiments
that revealed dynamical integration of stimulus infor-
mation with top-down prior knowledge (Section 3.2).
Finally, in Section 4, we construct the neural dynam-
ics of learning and recognition using the statistical
model of a spiking neural population. We introduce
the thermodynamic approaches to these dynamics.
2 A Bayesian view of the brain
The Bayesian brain hypothesis states that the brain
has a model of how causes generate external stimuli,
and that the brain is an organ that makes inferences
about the causes from an observed stimulus using this
model. By assuming that neuronal activity represents
the causes themselves as the most straightforward re-
alization of this view, here we briefly introduce how
nervous systems can realize the Bayesian inference
(Fig. 1). See Shimazaki 2019 [25] for more detailed
descriptions of this section. We will explain how the
Bayesian inference can be implemented by spiking
(binary) neurons with nonlinear activation functions
in Appendix and Section 4.
Let a set of the sensory stimuli (data) obtained
from the outside world be Y1:n = {Y1,Y2, . . . ,Yn},
where n is the number of samples. For simplicity,
we use Y without the subscript to denote one of the
samples. The sensory stimulus can be considered as
a sample from the distribution p¯(y). The organisms
can access only the samples (i.e., empirical distribu-
tion of Y), but can not directly access the underlying
distribution p¯(y). We consider that the organism’s
brain is a device that builds a model of this unknown
distribution based on past data and predicts the next
sensory stimulus. The model that the brain con-
structs is denoted as p(y|w), where w is a set of pa-
rameters representing the structure of the brain. The
dynamics of learning is the process of changing the
brain structure so that the model p(y|w) approaches
the true distribution of the data p¯(y). Namely, learn-
ing makes the distribution by the model closer to the
true distribution. Here we use the Kullback-Leibler
(KL) divergence as a criterion for the “distance” be-
tween distributions, and consider minimizing the KL
3
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divergence.2 The minimization of the KL divergence
is equivalent to maximizing the likelihood function
with the observed data Y1:n inserted into the model:
W∗ = arg max
w
log p(Y1:n|w). (1)
Under the assumption that the samples are indepen-
dent, the log marginal likelihood above is computed
as the sum of individual log marignal likehoods. We
expect that, by the learning rule of the neural sys-
tems, the parameters approach the optimal values,
W∗.
The model distribution of sensory stimuli is con-
structed through neural activity. Consider N neurons
and denote the activity of the ith neuron by xi.
3 We
denote the activity of the neural population by the
vector x = [x1, x2, . . . , xN ]
′. Consider the following
hierarchical representation of a joint probability dis-
tribution (namely, a joint probability density/mass
function) of sensory stimuli and neural activity,
p(y,x|w) = p(y|x,w)p(x|w). (2)
This joint distribution is called a generative model.
p(x|w) on the right-hand side represents neural activ-
ity that is not dependent on observation of the stim-
ulus, which we call the prior distribution. Here, we
assume that the spontaneous activity of neurons rep-
resents the prior distribution. p(y|x,w) is the repre-
sentation of external stimulus by neural activity and
is called an observation model. The model of the
sensory stimulus p(y|w) is obtained by integrating
(marginalizing) the generative model with respect to
the neural activity x, and henceforth p(Y|w) with
the data assigned to the model is called the marginal
likelihood function.
We consider the stimulus-evoked neural activity as
a sample from the posterior distribution that repre-
sents a joint probability mass or density of the neural
activity x given an observation Y:
p (x|Y,w) = p (Y|x,w) p (x|w)
p (Y|w) . (3)
The posterior distribution depends on the parame-
ter w. Use of the parameter obtained by learning
(Eq. 1) allows appropriate inference (empirical Bayes’
method). Eq. 3 gives the exact posterior distribution.
2There is no evidence that supports the KL divergence is
a metric suitable for natural data. In the future, one should
extend the discussion in this article with more appropriate met-
ric.
3We can think of xi as a continuous variable representing
the firing rate of a neuron, or a discrete variable that takes a
binary value (0 or 1) or a count as spiking activity. Alterna-
tively, one may consider a point-process model to represent the
time of spike occurrence.
However, it is unlikely that the neural activity real-
ized in the biological neural networks can constitute
this exact posterior distribution. Rather, we consider
that the neurons realize the one close to the exact
posterior distribution for inference, and henceforth
express the stimulus-evoked activity as an approxi-
mate posterior distribution q (x|Y):
q (x|Y) ≈ p (x|Y,w) . (4)
The approximate posterior distribution q (x|Y) is
also called a recognition model.
We briefly introduced a Bayesian view of neural
activity. The view presented here was not given top-
down but gradually formed over the years, both from
the theoretical development of the hierarchical mod-
els [26, 8] and from experimental studies that revealed
the relationship between spontaneous activity and
stimulus-evoked activity. In the next section, we will
introduce experimental studies that led to this view4
and review the stimulus-evoked dynamics observed in
neurophysiological experiments.
3 Experimental studies under-
pinning the Bayesian brain
3.1 A brief research history of sponta-
neous and stimulus-evoked activi-
ties
In a famous experiment published in 1996, Arieli et
al. found that endogenous or internal dynamics ex-
plained a significant fraction of stimulus-evoked ac-
tivity in the brain, and argued that these internal
dynamics play an essential role in the brain’s cogni-
tive functions [29]. In this experiment, they measured
the visual cortex of anesthetized cats exposed to vi-
sual stimuli, using a combination of electrodes and
an optical recording method with voltage-sensitive
dyes. They showed that the stimulus-response sepa-
rates into two components: internally-driven ongoing
activity and stimulus-dependent activity (Fig. 2A).
The internal dynamics significantly contributed to
the response dynamics, and the stimulus-dependent
activity appeared on top of this internal activity. In
4Note that the hypothesis that the stimulus-evoked activity
represents a posterior distribution is not the only hypothesis
for the neural activity. For example, Rao & Ballard’s predic-
tive coding theory [27] likewise considers the neural mechanism
that forms the posterior distribution based on the Bayes’ the-
orem, but the neural activity itself represents the prediction
error about the inferred causes rather than the causes them-
selves. The review by Aitchison & Lengyel [28] provides a
summary of different statistical views on neuronal population
activity.
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Figure 2: A An experiment by Arieli et al. examining the contribution of ongoing activity to stimulus-evoked
activity in the early visual cortices (V1/V2) [29]. The curve above is trial average of stimulus-responses from a
single channel of an optical imaging method. The maps in the lower four rows show neural activity measured
by the optical recording method. The linear sum (third row) of the stimulus-dependent activity obtained
as the trial average (first row) and the snapshot of ongoing activity immediately after the stimulus-response
(initial state, second row) predicted the observed response to a stimulus (fourth row). B The similarity
between spontaneous and stimulus-evoked activity discovered by Kenet et al. [30]. Left panel: An orientation
map of the area V2 obtained by trial averaging. Central panel: A snapshot of spontaneous activity. Right
panel: Stimulus-evoked activity. The orientation map was created by the stimulus orientation that induces
the map most correlated with snapshots of the spontaneous activity. The stimulus-evoked activity was also
obtained by this orientation. C A schematic of the relationship between possible spontaneous activities
and stimulus-evoked activity found by Luczak et al. [31]. The spontaneous activity here is the activity
triggered by the occurrence of an UPSTATE. Because correlations constrain neural activity (black ellipse),
the taken area by the spontaneous activity is narrower than that of uncorrelated activity with the same
variance (dotted circle). Individual stimulus-evoked activities (filled ellipses) have correlation structure
(noise correlation) similar to the one in spontaneous activity. The stimulus-evoked activities fit into the
realm of spontaneous activity. D Development of an optimal internal model revealed by Berkes et al. [32].
Top panel: The average of neural activities evoked by various natural stimuli (top left, red) are different from
spontaneous activity in the dark (bottom left, black) in immature animals, but the two activities are expected
to be similar in mature animals. Bottom panel: The KL-divergence between the average stimulus-evoked
activity and spontaneous activity decreased with postnatal days. A From Amos Arieli, Alexander Sterkin, Amiram
Grinvald, and Ad Aertsen. Dynamics of on- going activity: explanation of the large vari- ability in evoked cortical responses.
Science, 273(5283):1868-1871, 1996.. Reprinted with permission from AAAS. B Reprinted by permission from Springer Nature:
Nature Spontaneously emerging cortical representations of visual attributes, Tal Kenet et al, Copyright c©2003, Springer Nature
(2003) D From Pietro Berkes, Gergo˝ Orba´n, Ma´te´ Lengyel, Jo´zsef Fiser, Spontaneous Cortical Activity Reveals Hallmarks of
an Optimal Internal Model of the Environment, Science, 331(6013):83-87, 2011. Reprinted with permission from AAAS.
this paper, Arieli et al. wrote that “the effect of a
stimulus might be likened to the additional ripples
caused by tossing a stone into a wavy sea”, which
presented a new way of viewing a stimulus response
as a perturbation to the internal dynamics (see also
[33]). This view was a departure from the traditional
input-output view on the neural response to a stim-
ulus, and is consistent with the Bayesian view of the
brain, in that we see the stimulus-evoked activity is
a sample from the posterior distribution. If we look
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at the Bayes’ formula (Eq. 3), this equation can be
seen as the process in which the spontaneous activity
representing the prior distribution is modulated by
observation, resulting in the stimulus-evoked activ-
ity that represents the posterior distribution. In this
sense, their study already predicted the importance
of the spontaneous activity on shaping recognition as
a prior distribution of the Bayesian inference.
Arieli and colleauges presented these results in an
attempt to answer the controversial question in the
1990s about cortical variability: Why do neurons
show spiking activity that is highly variable and less
reproducible even if we presnt the same stimulus?
[34, 35]. However, this study initiated subsequent
studies that further clarified the relationship between
spontaneous activity and stimulus-evoked activity,
which promoted the Bayesian view of the brain, as
explained below.
Spontaneous activity has a certain statistical struc-
ture rather than random noise [36]. Then what is
that structure? Through the series of experiments
by Arieli and colleagues, it was becoming clear that
the structure of spontaneous activity is similar to that
of stimulus-evoked activity. For example, Tsodyks et
al. showed that using the same experimental tech-
niques as in the above-mentioned paper, the collec-
tive neural activity that activates single neurons has
similar structure during spontaneous and stimulus-
evoked activity in the visual cortex [37]. More di-
rectly, Kenet et al. showed that the collective ac-
tivity at a given moment while neurons fired spon-
taneously was very similar to the collective activity
when a stimulus was presented (Fig. 2B) [30]. Neu-
rons in the early visual cortices shows selectivity to
stimulus orientations. Therefore, the optical record-
ings reveal the orientation map of the recorded area.
In this experiment, Kenet et al. showed that, in a sta-
tistically significant manner, the spontaneous activity
exhibits activities resembling the stimulus-responses
(orientation maps) of neurons to grating stimuli with
specific orientations. The authors argued that the
spontaneous activity with the characteristic struc-
ture, such as those representing the orientation selec-
tivity, shape the internal state (context) of the brain.
Rather than merely describing the similarity be-
tween snapshots of the spontaneous and evoked ac-
tivities, a study by Luczak et al. represented the
population activity as a point in a high-dimensional
probability space and examined the relationship of
the distribution of the points obtained from stimulus-
evoked activity with the distribution obtained from
spontaneous activity. More precisely, Luczak et al.
examined the relationship between the spontaneous
and stimulus-evoked activities of the rat auditory cor-
tex in response to auditory stimuli (natural stimuli
and artificial tones) using the simultaneous record-
ings of 45 neurons. They found that the responses to
auditory stimuli fit in the space that the spontaneous
activity could take place (Fig. 2C). This result makes
sense if we consider that the stimulus-evoked activity
represents a conditional probability that is obtained
by conditioning a prior distribution representing the
spontaneous activity by the stimulus.
In the experiments of Luczak et al, they used the
limited number of stimuli. If we extrapolate their ob-
servations by assuming that we could use more stim-
uli, then it may be expected that the sum of the
stimulus-evoked activities fills the state space that
spontaneous activity can take place. In math, it is
expressed as:∫
q (x|y) p¯ (y) dy ≈ p (x|w) . (5)
Two conditions are required for an exact equality
to hold in the above equation. First, the stimulus-
evoked activity of neurons (recognition model) must
represent an exact posterior distribution, i.e., the in-
ference must be exact: q (x|Y) = p (x|Y,w). Second,
the model distribution of sensory stimuli (data) as-
sumed from the generative model must represent the
distribution of data in the external world: p (Y|w) =
p¯ (Y). In this case, Eq. 5 is the exact formula that
the prior distribution is obtained by marginalizing
the generative model with respect to the stimuli:5∫
p (x|y,w) p (y|w) dy = p (x|w) .
Thus, close distributions at the left and right sides of
Eq. 5 suggests that the organism possesses an opti-
mal internal model and performs optimal inference.
Could such a thing really be happening?
By an experiment with ferrets, Berkes et al. re-
ported that the average of the stimulus-evoked ac-
tivities in response to various stimuli and the sponta-
neous activity indeed approached to each other as the
animals develop (Fig. 2D) [32]. In this experiment,
they recorded neural activity in the visual cortex
when presenting movies to awake ferrets under free-
viewing conditions. They also recorded spontaneous
activity in the dark. The recordings were made at the
time of eye-opening (postnatal days 29-30), comple-
tion of orientation selectivity (P44-45), and two post-
maturity periods (P83-92 and P129-151). The results
confirmed that the KL divergence between the aver-
age stimulus-evoked activity (left side of Eq. 5) and
5However, this paper identifies the stimulus-evoked activity
with the exact posterior distribution and considers only con-
struction of an optimal generative model by learning.
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spontaneous activity (right side of Eq. 5) decreased
with development.
Based on these and other experimental results, the
view has been formed that sees the spontaneous ac-
tivity as sampling from a prior distribution and the
stimulus-evoked activity as sampling from a posterior
distribution, and that the optimal internal model is
constructed through learning.6
3.2 Recognition dynamics
If we assume that the brain realizes the Bayesian in-
ference by expressing the posterior distribution using
stimulus-evoked activity, it is necessary to consider
the neural dynamics leading to such posterior distri-
bution. This is because the stimulus-evoked activ-
ity of neurons must follow the dynamics constrained
by neuronal mechanisms. Emphasis on the dynam-
ics is in contrast with some of the machine learn-
ing approaches in which researchers can obtain the
approximate posterior analytically.7 In this section,
we present experimental results suggesting that the
brain dynamicaly integrates information about an in-
put stimulus with prior knowledge. These experi-
ments show that this process of integrating informa-
tion is closely related to animals’ cognitive capacities.
In the next section, we will introduce a hierachical
Bayesian model that describes the neural dynamics
presented here.8
Two types of inputs constitute the dynamics of
neural activity. One is the input from feedfor-
ward connections, which are projected sequentially
from the sensory organs that govenrn the organism’s
senses, to the lower and then to the higher brain re-
gions. The other type of input comes from recurrent
connections, which include horizontal and lateral con-
nections within the same column or cortical area, and
feedback connections from the higher areas. The in-
puts from the feedforward and recurrent connections
should arrive at the target region with different tim-
ings.
In the case of the visual system, the initial response
to a high-contrast visual stimulus reaches the final
6However, see also [38] for the recent large-scale analysis
on stimulus-evoked and ongoing activity of more than 10, 000
neurons in mouse visual cortex, which provided an opposing
result.
7However, some other sampling methods such as the
Markov chain Monte Carlo method follow dynamics; therefore,
these algorithms can potentially be implemented in neural sys-
tems.
8Note that here we introduce studies based on the classical
experimental paradigm in which the effects of the stimulus-
independent internal dynamics are removed by trial averaging.
However, we will take into account the internal (or recurrent)
dynamics that is triggered by stimuli and tasks.
stage of the ventral pathway within about 100 ms
[39, 40].9 It is thought that the feedforward inputs
cause the initial stimulus response. In the visual ar-
eas (e.g., V1, V2, and V4), the difference in response
latencies between the lower cortical area and the next
area is about 10 ms, but the feedback input from the
higher region to the lower area takes about 10 ms,
so the effect of the feedback may not catch up to the
initial resposne [39]. Based on this fact, we can ex-
amine the computations performed primarily by the
feedforward networks from properties of neuron’s ini-
tial responses. It turns out that the magnitude of the
initial response depends only on the characteristics
and intensity of the stimulus and not related to the
cognitive functions of the animal (see below). For ex-
ample, it was suggested that the orientation selectiv-
ity of the classical receptive field of monkey V1 neu-
rons is formed without inputs from the feedback con-
nections from higher cortical areas [44].10 The com-
putations that can be performed by the feedforward
connections should not be underestimated. Indeed,
the remarkable performance of artificial convolutional
neural networks (CNNs) in recognition tasks, which
imitate operations of only feedforward and horizon-
tal connections, has demonstrated the high computa-
tional power of a cascade of nonlinear units without
feedback connections [48].
Nevertheless, it has been pointed out that recur-
sive inputs through feedback connections play an es-
sential role in various cognitive functions of the brain.
The influence of inputs from the feedback connections
should appear after the feedforward input caused the
initial response. However, the dynamics after the ini-
tial response are not only influenced by the feedback
connections but also by other neuronal mechanisms.
For example, spiking mechanisms of an individual
neuron may undergo sensitization resulting in reduc-
tion of the firing rate. If this happends at presynaptic
neurons, then the feedforward inputs may be already
attenuated. In order to dissociate these confouding
9The response latency of visual neurons depends on the
stimulus intensity. However, it is highly variable among in-
dividual neurons [41, 42, 43]. In addition, the definition and
detection methods significantly affect estimated values of the
latency. Here, we present the values from the cited paper. The
results of meta-analyses of the various literature can be found
in Lamme & Roelfsema [39]. Finally, the input to the MT field
via the superior colliculus and the pulvinar, which is the path-
way different from the ventral pathway, takes less than 40 ms.
So the visual information processing takes place with multiple
time-scales.
10Note that mechanisms for the formation of orientation se-
lectivity by visual neurons differ among species significantly.
For example, the orientation selectivity is formed in the visual
cortex in monkeys and cats. However, in mouse, rabbit, and
zebrafish, the orientation selectivity is already found in the
retina [45, 46, 47].
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mechanisms, researchers constructed thoughtful ex-
periments that can identify the effect of the delayed
inputs that are presumably mediated by feedback cir-
cuits. In the following, we present studies that iden-
tified the impact of feedback inputs on the stimulus-
response and its relationship to animal’s cognitive ca-
pacities.
Perception of visual stimuli A series of exper-
iments by Lamme and his colleagues suggested that
perception of a visual stimulus requires integration of
the stimulus inputs by feedforward connections with
delayed inputs by recurrent connections conveying
contextual information [39] (Fig. 3). Lamme et al.
used a visual stimulus paradigm called figure-ground
separation [49] to examine stimulus responses in the
primary visual cortex (V1) of awake monkeys. They
found that the context of the visual stimulus outside
the classical receptive fields of V1 neurons was ex-
pressed in the response activity 80-100 ms after the
onset of the visual stimulus [49]. The presence or ab-
sence of the modulation in this part of the response
correlated with reports on the perceptual experience
(awareness) of the stimulus by the monkeys [50, 51].
As a visual stimulus, on the one condition, Lamme
and colleagues presented segmented lines with a spe-
cific slope (figure) on top of a background image
(ground) that is also composed of segmented lines
but perpendicular to the figure (Fig. 3A). They pre-
sented the “figure” within the classical receptive fields
of the recorded V1 neurons. On the other condition,
they tilted the ground so that the orientaion of the
segmented lines in the ground becomes the same as
of the figure. In this case, the distinction between
the figure and ground disappears, although the stim-
uli within the classical receptive field are the same
under the two conditions. When they compared the
responses of neurons to the stimulus with or without
the separation of the figure and ground, they found
no difference in the firing rates in its early compo-
nent starting from about 30-40 ms, but the firing
rates of late components starting from 80-100 ms dif-
fer: The ‘figure’ stimulus induced the larger activity
at the later part of the stimulus-response (Fig. 3B)
[50, 52, 51].11 In this article, we call this later part of
the response a “late component” and change of the
late component due to conditions on the presented
stimulus, “delayed modulation”. A closer look at the
temporal evolution of the delayed modulation reveals
that the modulation starts at 80 ms after the stimulus
onset if the classical receptive field is at the boundary
of the figure and 100 ms after the stimulus onset if it
11A similar effect was observed not only in the orientation
but also in the figure-ground separation using disparity, color,
and luminance as a context [50].
Lamme & Roelfsema. Trends Neurosci.2000
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C
Figure 3: Delayed modulation of the stimulus-
response of V1 neurons as revealed by the Lamme
et al.’s figure-ground separation experiments [52, 39]
A Location of the receptive fields of V1 neurons in
relation to the stimulus used for the figure-ground
separation. A figure is shown in this example. The
figure disappears when the oriented lines in the back-
ground exhibit the same direction as those at the cen-
ter. Recordings were made when the receptive field
was (a) in the figure, (b) on the border, and (c) in the
background. B Comparison of the stimulus-responses
(average of 32 electrode recordings) of neurons whose
receptive fields are in the figure, while the orienta-
tions of the figure and ground are different (surface)
or same (background). Differences in response ap-
peared from approximately 100 ms [39] (112.5-122.5
ms [52]). C Comparison of the stimulus-responses
when the receptive field is at the boundary of the
figure, while the orientation of the figure and the
ground are different (surface) or they match (back-
ground). The responses differed after approximately
80 ms [39] (90 ms [52]). Reprinted from Trends in neuro-
sciences, 23(11), Victor AF Lamme and Pieter R Roelfsema,
The distinct modes of vision offered by feedforward and recur-
rent processing, 571-579, Copyright (2000), with permission
from Elsevier.
is in the figure [52, 53] (Fig. 3A). These modulations
occur later than 50 ms, at which neurons show selec-
tivity to the orientation. From these resutls, Lamme
and colleagues suggested that the information pro-
cessing takes place in the order of orientation selec-
tion, boundary detection, and figure detection.
Feedback input from higher cortical areas is
thought to cause this delayed modulation rather than
8
3 EXPERIMENTAL STUDIES UNDERPINNING THE BAYESIAN BRAIN
connections within V1/V2 because lesion of the ex-
trastriate cortex beyond V2 eliminated modulation
of the response after about 100 ms (late component)
involved in figure detection [54].12 Since the initial
sweep in the entire ventral pathway completes within
about 100 ms, the late component of the response
in V1 after 100 ms can reflect computations done
in the inferior temporal cortex and beyond, which
makes it more likely that the late component reflects
perceptual experiences. The following experimental
results support the hypothesis that, not the initial
response, but this delayed modulation is indeed in-
volved in perceptual experiences. (i) In experiments
presenting different figure-ground stimuli to two eyes
(binocularly rivalrous displays), the delayed modu-
lation depends on the perceived figure (or ground)
caused by its combination, and not on the response
expected for the figure-ground stimulus presented to
the one eye [50]. (ii) Even if animals are exposed
to the stimulus in which the figure and ground are
separated, the delayed modulation after 100 ms se-
lectively disappears in neural responses of trials in
which the animals failed to report the presence of the
figure [51]. (iii) The larger the amount of the delayed
modulation (at responses involving figure detection)
is, the shorter the reaction time of the saccade used to
report the figure, and the higher the accuracy of the
report [53]. (iv) In monkey experiments using back-
ward masking with pattern masks, the accuracy of
the figure detection correlated with magnitude of the
delayed modulation reduced by the masks [57]. (v)
Anesthetization selectively removed the late compo-
nent related to the figure detection. The initial re-
sponse (including responses involving boundary de-
tection) and neurons’ receptive field were unaffected
by the anesthesia [58].13
In sum, their results suggest that the late compo-
nent in the responses of V1 neurons 100 ms after the
stimulus onset was affected by feedback inputs from
the extrastriatal and inferior temporal cortex, which
may reflect the global context involving the percep-
tual experience. To the contrary, neurons in the su-
perior temporal sulcus of the temporal lobe display
12But, see also [55] that showed the late components of early
monocular visual neurons are not related to the feedback in-
puts by masking experiments in which the target and mask
are presented to different eyes. The authors proposed that late
component is created as the after-discharge caused by lateral
inhibitory networks without feedback inputs [56]. Involvement
of feedback inputs in the late component may depend on the
type of stimulus and how complex the context is.
13Experiments using rats reported that the initial response
(0−100 ms) of neurons in the visual cortex remains unchanged
as the concentration of anesthesia (desflurane) increases, but
the late component (150 − 1000 ms) is selectively lost under
anesthesia [59].
information on global features such as the face of a
person or a monkey 91 ms after the stimulus onset,
and 51 ms later they integrate detailed information
about the individuals and facial expression. These
results suggest that, after 100 ms of stimulus onset,
the entire recurrent circuit of visual areas, including
the inferior temporal cortex and beyond, is used to
perform computations for recognition.
Perception of tactile stimuli The perceptual
experience of a tactile stimulus also involves mod-
ulation of the late component of the neuronal re-
sponse in somatosensory systems [60]. Moreover,
by selectively eliminating the late component using
optogenetic stimulation, it was found that presence
of the late component causes perceptual experience.
Sachidhanandam et al. reported in vivo recordings
of the barrel cortex in the mouse primary somatosen-
sory cortex (S1) and found that the membrane poten-
tial responding to a whisker stimulus had an initial
response component less than 50 ms and a delayed
response component of 50-400 ms. The presence or
absence of the late component in the membrane po-
tential correlated with whether the mice reported the
sensory stimuli correctly or not (HIT or MISS). This
was also true for the late component of the postsy-
naptic firing rates. However, no such relationship was
found for the initial component of the response. Fur-
thermore, when they selectively suppressed the late
component 100 ms after the stimulus onset by optoge-
netic stimulation, the animals reduced the perceptual
reports, confirming that this late component is one of
the causes of the perceptual experience [61].
Manita et al. identified the circuit underpinning
the late component and demonstrated that the feed-
back input from a higher cortical area is necessary for
reporting the perceptual experience [62]. Manita et
al. recorded the response of S1 neurons to electrical
stimulation of hind legs of mice. They found that the
response was clearly separated into an initial response
that appeared about 20 ms after the stimulus onset
and a late component that occurred at about 110 ms
later. Using pharmacological and optogenetic meth-
ods, they demonstrated that the late component is
caused by a reverberation circuit that projects from
S1 to the secondary motor area (M2) and returns to
S1. Manita et al. also found a causal effect of the
late component on sensory recognition. Inhibition of
bilateral projections from M2 to S1 under free mov-
ing conditions eliminated the mice’s inherent prefer-
ence for a certain texture of the tactile stimuli and
worsened their performance on a tactile stimulus dis-
crimination task. In addition, when they selectively
suppressed the late component by optogenetic stimu-
lation, the mice did not respond to electrical stimula-
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tion to the hind legs. These results indicate that the
initial response is insufficient for tactile perception,
and the delayed input by the recurrent circuit from
M2 to S1 is required for accurate recognition of the
tactile stimuli.14
Top-down attention It is known that, with at-
tention, animals can actively modulate the late com-
ponent. Attention is a neural mechanism that fa-
cilitates processing of specific stimuli. In particular,
top-down attention refers to the mechanism by which
animals can actively select an object to be processed
[63]. In the case of visual attention, there are three
types of attentions: spatial attention directed at a
part of the space, feature-based attention directed at
a feature of the stimulus such as color or shape, and
object-based attention. The effect of top-down vi-
sual attention is more pronounced in higher visual
areas, and in general the attention elevates responses
of neurons with receptive fields to which attention is
directed [64]. Here, we first introduce an experiment
by Reynolds et al. that examined the effect of spa-
tial attention on the response of monkey V4 neurons
when a single stimulus is presented within the classi-
cal receptive field.
In Reynolds et al.’s experiment, they presented two
simultaneous stimuli to monkeys fixating at the cen-
ter of the screen (Fig. 4A, see schematics on the
right). At the start of a trial, a cue stimulus is pre-
sented to an animal that gives an indication as to
whether to pay attention to the left or right stimulus.
They recorded the activity of neurons containing one
of the presented stimuli in their receptive field. Each
panel in Fig. 4A shows dynamics of the neuronal re-
sponses under different stimulus contrasts (average
of 84 neuronal responses). The black line represents
the response when attention is directed to the recep-
tive field, and the gray line shows the response when
attention is directed outside the receptive field. For
example, at the highest contrast, we find no difference
in the responses up to 200 ms after the stimulus onset
between the conditions with and without attention.
However, we observe an effect of attention in the pe-
riod from 200 ms to 300 ms after the stimulus onset.
The response of neurons to a stimulus increases
with strength of the stimulus contrast, which is rep-
resented as a nonlinear response function of the neu-
rons (Fig. 4B gray line). When the monkey directs
attention to the neurons’ receptive field, it alters the
14The response of mouse S1 to electrical stimuli completely
separated into the initial and late components, therefore does
not integrate information from the stimulus with recurrent in-
puts. However, the late component may act as a primer for
the subsequent stimulus. Similarly, if the feedback input from
M1 to S1 is unspecified, it may also act as priming for stimuli
to other sites.
response function because the firing rate at each con-
trast increases. The resulting shift of the response
function to the left caused by attention is called con-
trast gain control (Fig. 4B black line). Another pos-
sibility is response gain control, in which the firing
rate increases even at high contrasts without satura-
tion. Reynolds and colleuagues confirmed that the
contrast gain control explains the effect of attention
on the response function, rather than the response
gain control (Fig. 4C).15 They also showed that the
attention increased the statistical power of neurons
to detect stimuli.16 In conclusion, Reynolds et al.
showed that the higher cognitive function such as at-
tention is explained by the gain control, which is the
basis of adaptation mechanisms of neural systems.
Further, this gain effect appears later in the response
activity. Therefore the dynamics of attention is rep-
resented by the delayed gain control.
Many experiments show that other types of atten-
tion than the spatial attention can also modulate the
late component. Motter’s study was the first to show
that attention can be directed to stimulus features
and reported that the attentional effect appears in
the sustained firing activiy during stimulus presen-
tation [65]. In this experiment, monkeys performed
a task to detect the slope of rod-shaped visual stim-
uli with different colors while recording the activity
of V4 neurons. The firing rate of neurons 150-200
ms after the stimulus onset increased when the char-
acteristics of the stimulus in the receptive field were
consistent with those to which monkeys directed at-
tention. In this experiment, they found no effect of
attention during the initial response that appeared 50
ms after the stimulus onset nor duing a preparation
period.
The classic example of the object-based attention
15In this experiment, they used a suboptimal stimulus; there-
fore, the firing rates of neurons are not saturated even at the
highest contrast. That is, this mechanism is not a simple gain
control caused by the response saturation. Also note that other
studis suggest that the effect of attention is represented by the
response gain control [63].
16The task was to detect appearance of a tilted grating stim-
ulus among vertical grating stimuli. The sensitivity (estima-
tion accuracy) to continuous stimulus features depends on the
magnitude of the first-order derivative (slope) of the response
function with respect to the feature. Attention reduced the
sensitivity to contrast changes in the medium to high contrast,
where we observe the large effect of attention. Therefore, the
increased firing rate due to attention may be used to increase
the sensitivity of other stimulus features than the contrast.
For example, for neurons with Gaussian (von Mises) orienta-
tion selectivity, increasing the firing rate in a multiplicative
manner increases the orientation sensitivity (at non-optimal
orientation). We can not argue the effect of attention on the
information coding of the stimulus unless we specify the neu-
ronal response function to the stimulus feature and how the
attention changes the function.
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Figure 4: An experiment by Reynolds et al. examining the effect of attention on the stimulus response of
monkey V4 neurons. A Average stimulus-response from 84 neurons. The solid black line is the response when
monkeys directed attention to the receptive field of recorded neurons. The solid gray line is the response
when attention is directed away from the receptive field. The panels show, from left to right, the response of
neurons to, from low to high, contrast stimuli. The stimuli were presented for 250 ms. Asterisks at the top
of the panels are the test results on the difference between responses with and without attention by dividing
the observation period into 100 ms intervals. B A schematic diagram of the gain control by attention. C
Average firing rate up to 400 ms after the onset of stimulus presentation. The solid black and gray lines are
the firing rates with or without attention, respectively. It displays the average of 39 neurons that showed
significant changes by attention. Reproduced with permission from [42] Fig.4, 5. Reprinted from Neuron, 26(3),
John H Reynolds, Tatiana Pasternak, and Robert Desimone, Attention increases sensitivity of V4 neurons, 703-714, Copyright
(2000), with permission from Elsevier.
is an experiment by Roelfsema and colleagues exam-
ining the responses of monkey V1 neurons in a curve-
tracing task [66]. In this experiment, they presented
two curves to monkeys: One is a curve connected
to a fixation point and the other is a curve not con-
nected to the fixation point (Fig. 5A). The end points
are marked by red circles. After 600 ms has passed
since the onset of stimulus presentation, the monkeys
are trained to saccade the eyes to an endpoint of the
curve connected to the fixation point (target). During
the stimulus presentation, one of the two curves en-
ters the receptive field of V1 neurons (green sqaures).
Note that the stimuli in the receptive fields were iden-
tical under the two conditions. Comparing responses
of neurons with and without the receptive field on the
target showed no difference in the initial responses
starting at 35 ms after the stimulus onset. However,
the firing rate increased after 235 ms if the receptive
field of a neuron is on the target (Fig. 5B). When the
stimulus curves were arranged to intersect each other,
the delayed modulation was still observed for neurons
with the receptive field on the target, suggesting that
V1 neurons participate in the computation for recog-
nizing smoothly connected lines as the same object
in the late part of the response.
Poort et al. investigated the effects of attention
on neuronal activity related to the aforementioned
figure-ground separation. This study showed that at-
tention increases the V1 neurons’ response involved
in detection of the figures 204 ms after the stimulus
onset, whereas the attention modulated activity of
V4 neurons at 159 ms after the stimulus onset. That
is, the effect of attention was seen earlier in V4 than
in V1 [53].17 From this result, Poort et al. proposed a
17V1 neurons show an initial response at 40 ms after the
stimulus onset, delayed modulation to detect a boundary at 60
ms, and delayed modulation to detect a figure at 95 ms. These
are followed by modulation by attention at 204 ms. In V4, the
initial response was observed at 52 ms after the stimulus onset,
followed by delayed modulation at 67 ms, and modulation by
attention at 159 ms
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Figure 5: An experiment by Roelfsema et al. to in-
vestigate the effect of object-based attention [66, 39].
A A monkey gazes at the fixation point (a small red
circle) and moves its gaze to a point (a large red cir-
cle) at the end of the curve (target) connected to
the fixation point 600 ms after the onset of stimu-
lus presentation. Left panel: The classical receptive
field of V1 neurons shown in the square is on a curve
connected to the fixation point. Right panel: The re-
ceptive field is on the curve that is not connected to
the fixation point. B An average stimulus-response of
V1 neurons (mean of the normalized responses from
multiple recordings). Even though the stimuli were
identical within the receptive field, the activity rates
differ when the receptive field was on the attended
object (the curve connected to the solid viewpoint)
and when the receptive field was on an unattended
object. This difference did not show up in the initial
response, but appeared 235 ms after the stimulus on-
set. Note that the normalization was calculated by
using the peak values and spontaneous firing rates
on the average of the responses of two stimulus con-
ditions. If there is a difference in the maximum firing
rates between stimuli, the normalized peak value will
also show a difference. Reprinted from Trends in neuro-
sciences, 23(11), Victor AF Lamme and Pieter R Roelfsema,
The distinct modes of vision offered by feedforward and recur-
rent processing, 571-579, Copyright (2000), with permission
from Elsevier.
model in which figure detection occurred at V1 from
95 ms, and the effect of attention at V4 that appears
at 159 ms reached V1 and enhances figure detection
from 204 ms.
These experimental results show that attention
causes time-delayed modulation of the responses of
V1 and V4 neurons. Most examples of the delayed
modulations presented here reported no change in
spontaneous activity before stimulus presentation as
well as in the intial rising phase of the response.
Hence the observed delayed modulation is likely to
be caused by feedback input driven by the stimulus.
However, a substantial number of literatures also re-
port that, even before presenting the stimulus, at-
tention significantly elevates spontaneous activity of
neurons whose receptive fields contain the attended
features [67, 43, 63]. The presence of the attentional
effect on the spontaneous activity indicates that the
presentation of a cue stimulus that initiates the task
has a prolonged effect that extends across trials [67].
These dynamics, too, can be seen as delayed mod-
ulation, which, however, requires the dynamics with
more extended time-scale used for task understand-
ing and memory retention.
Reward values Finally, several studies postulate
that reward value is also represented by the late com-
ponent. Schultz proposes that the response activity
of dopamine neurons consists of an initial and late
components, and that the late component represents
subjective reward value and utility [68, 69]. The
40-120 ms early response component of dopamine
neurons represents stimulus intensity, while the 150-
250 ms late component represents value [70]. Un-
der challenging tasks, the delayed response appears
much later and completely separated from the ini-
tial response, indicating computing the value takes
a longer period of time [71]. Schultz proposes that
such a two-component response allows animals to re-
spond quickly to rewarding stimuli while eliminating
the possibility of error as much as possible.
4 Thermodynamics of the
Bayesian brain
So far, we looked over experimental results suggest-
ing that organisms acquire a generative model of the
external world by learning (Section 3.1), and that
the dynamics of feedforward and recurrent inputs re-
alizes integration of input information with internal
states (Section 3.2). In this section, we explain these
experimental results as dynamics that realizes the
Bayesian inference by introducing a generative model
constructed from spiking activity of neurons.
In particular, bearing in mind the attention ex-
periment by Reynolds et al. [42], we reproduce the
delayed gain control by attention as the dynamics of
the Bayesian inference. We then show that this dy-
namics constitutes an information-theoretic engine,
termed ‘neural engine’, which works analogously to a
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heat engine in thermodynamics [1, 2, 25]. Based on
this paradigm, we explain how to quantify internally-
defined quantities such as awareness, attention, and
reward value from neural data. Finally, we provide
an unified thermodynamic view on the learning and
inference, deriving laws about the entropy of neural
activity by reconstructing the process of integrating
a stimulus input and prior knowledge under the max-
imum entropy principle.
4.1 The Bayesian inference by a neu-
ral population
We describe the spike response of a population of neu-
rons using a generative model. See Appendix for the
relationship between the response function, gain con-
trol, and the generative model using a simpler, inde-
pendent neurons. Below we consider the behaviour
of a population of correlated neurons. Consider N
neurons. We represent the state of the ith neuron by
xi = {0, 1}, and the activity pattern of the popula-
tion by x = [x1, x2, . . . , xN ]
′. The input stimulus is
represented by the d-dimensional column vector Y.
The generative model is composed of an observation
model and a prior. We construct the observation
model that represents the input stimulus Y by the
combination of the neurons, using a normal distribu-
tion:
p(Y|x,Σ,Φ) = 1√|2piΣ|e− 12 (Y−Φx)′Σ−1(Y−Φx). (6)
We used Σ as the covariance matrix. Φ is a d × N
matrix with an array of the basis vector for each neu-
ron (Φ = [φ1,φ2, . . . ,φN ]). Φx is a representation
of a stimulus by the population of neurons. Next, we
represent the prior distribution of neuronal activity
by the Ising model,18
p(x|Ω) = e 12x′Ωx−ψ0(Ω). (7)
Here Ω is a matrix of N × N dimension, where the
diagonal and off-diagonal components are the bias
and second-order interaction terms, respectively. The
posterior distribution based on the generative model
18The Ising model is a model that represents the distribu-
tion of binary patterns. The distribution contains no statistical
structure other than those specified by the first and second-
order statistics. Such a distribution belongs to the maximum
entropy model. The Ising model is a standard model intro-
duced in statistical physics as a model for interacting magnetic
spins. It later became a model for consolidation and retrieval
of memory, and used in machine learning today.
consisting of Eqs. 6 and 7 is written as follows:
p(x|Y,w) = p(x|Ω)p(Y|x,Σ,Φ)
p(Y|w)
∝ exp
[
1
2
x′Ωx + (Y′ΦΣ−1x− 1
2
x′Φ′Σ−1Φx)
]
.
(8)
In this equation, we did not show terms that do not
depend on x. We defined a set of the model param-
eters as w = {Ω,Σ,Φ}. This posterior distribution
becomes once again an Ising model.
Neural activity sampled from this posterior distri-
bution achieves a correct inference for the external
cause x. However, in the above derivation, we did not
consider the dynamics leading to this exact posterior
distribution. Here, to consider the dynamics forming
the posterior distribution given by Eq. 8, we extend
the generative model as follows. In the following, we
fix the parameter w.
First, we replace the covariance matrix of the ob-
servation model Σ with α−1Σ, where α is a scaler
parameter. For example, when Σ = I (I is a unit
matrix), α is a parameter for the accuracy. Next,
we replace the parameter Ω in the prior distribution
with βΩ using a scalar β. By these extensions, we
can describe the dynamics of recognition leading to
the optimal inference by the dynamics of β and α.
Let the posterior distribution based on this new gen-
erative model be the recognition model representing
neural activity. We can express it as:
q(x|Y) = p(x|βΩ)p(Y|x, αΣ,Φ)
p(Y|w, β, α)
∝ exp
[
β
2
x′Ωx + α(Y′ΦΣ−1x− 1
2
x′Φ′Σ−1Φx)
]
.
(9)
A posterior distribution based on the original gener-
ative model (Eq. 8) is constituted when β = 1 and
α = 1. The posterior distribution is identical to the
prior distribution when β = 1 and α = 0, namely
when the variance of the observation model diverges.
Thus, one could realize the dynamics leading to the
original posterior distribution (Eq. 8) from sponta-
neous activity after the stimulus onset by changing α
from 0 to 1 under β = 1. Without loss of genrality,
we can consider that the orignal posterior distribu-
tion offers the optimal inference.19 Thus this is a
process in which the recognition model dynamically
approaches the posterior distribution that realizes the
19Given w, it is possible to search the optimal β and α for
each sample under the marginal likelihood principle. One can
alway rescale Σ and Ω to make β = 1 and α = 1 at the optimal
distribution.
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optimal inference. Here we assume that neural activ-
ity in each state follows an equilibrium distribution
(Eq. 24). This process is called a quasi-static pro-
cess.20
In the following, the recognition model (Eq. 9) is
concisely wirtten as
q(x|Y) = 1
Zβ,α(Y)
e−βH0(x)+αH1(x), (10)
where H0(x) is a feature derived from the prior dis-
tribution and H1(x) is a feature derived from the ob-
servation model:
H0(x) = −1
2
x′Ωx, (11)
H1(x) = Y′ΦΣ−1x− 1
2
x′Φ′Σ−1Φx. (12)
The expectation of a feature by the recognition model
is called the expectation parameter. We define the ex-
pectation parameter as 〈H0(x)〉 = U and 〈H1(x)〉 =
V . Note that 〈·〉 represents expectation by the recog-
nition model. From now on, U is called internal activ-
ity, and V is called stimulus-related activity. Given
that the set of parameters w is fixed, the recognition
model becomes a function of β and α. That is, we
can represent the dynamics of this neural population
in a two-dimensional space. One can also control the
distribution by the expectation parameters U and V ,
instead of β and α.
As an example, we explain the behavior of the
recognition model (Eq. 10) by considering a popula-
tion of five neurons (Fig. 6A). We define the param-
eters of the generative model such that the activity
features related to the internal activity (H0(x)), and
the feature for the stimulus-related activityH1(x) are
given as follows. H0(x) contains the bias term for all
neurons and does not include the interactions. We
note that the smaller β is, the higher the activity
rates are. Next, H1(x) contains bias and interaction
20One can think of several approaches to realizing the dy-
namics of neural activity that approaches the optimal posterior
distribution. As an analytical method, one can consider the
gradient dynamics leading to the MAP estimate of the poste-
rior distribution. Many of the inferences based on the predic-
tive coding theory of Rao & Ballard and the free energy prin-
ciple of Friston et al. belong to this type of inference. Here, as
a complementary to this idea, we consider that the scaling pa-
rameters of the recognition model vary dynamically to change
the distribution from a prior distribution (spontaneous activ-
ity) to a posterior distribution (evoked activity). The other
approach is to use the sampling method, which samples neu-
ral activity from the targeted posterior distribution using the
Markov chain Monte Carlo method, starting from an initial
spontaneous state of a neural population. This process is a
non-equilibrium process that depends on the spiking history.
Both approaches construct approximate posterior distributions
(recognition models).
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Figure 6: The gain control by a model of neural pop-
ulation. A A group of five neurons. Neurons 1, 2, and
3 in red change their activity rates and correlations
according to α. The activity rates of all neurons, in-
cluding yellow neurons, is controlled by β. B The
dependency of the activity rates of neurons 1, 2, 3,
or neurons 4, 5 on α. The dotted line is obtained at
β = 1. The solid line is β = 0.8, which increases the
overall activity level. The change in β realizes the
gain control for neurons 1, 2, 3. C The relationship
between the expectation parameters V and U and α.
The expectation parameters are also subject to the
gain control by β. We used a diagonal matrix with
the diagonal component [−2,−2,−2, 0, 0] as the pa-
rameter Ω for the prior distribution. The parameters
of the observation model were Y = 0.1, Σ = I, and
Φ = [1, 1, 1, 0, 0]. Created using the parameters given
by the genearative model with reference to Fig. 1 in
[1, 2].
terms related to neurons 1, 2, and 3, which means
that increasing α above 0 increases activity rates of
neurons 1, 2, and 3 as well as their correlations. In
other words, it induces a cell assembly encoding the
stimulus.
The dotted line in Fig. 6B shows the activity rate
of each neuron 〈xi〉 (i = 1, 2, . . . , 5) when we change
α while fixing β at 1. The activity rates of neurons
1, 2, and 3 increase with α and saturate at the upper
limit of 1. To the contrary, since the stimulus-related
activity does not include neurons 4 and 5, they are
constant regardless of α. The solid line represents the
activity rates of neurons when we increase the overall
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activity level by setting β = 0.8. By decreasing β, the
activity rates of neurons 4 and 5 increase. Similarly,
the activity rates of neurons 1, 2, and 3 increase,
but the response function shifts to the left because
the activity rates are subject to the upper bound.
That is, we realize the gain control of the response
function by adjusting the activity rates of all neurons
using β.21 Fig. 6C shows the internal activity U and
stimulus-related activity V when we change α under
β = 1 or β = 0.8. We observe similar gain control
with respect to these average features.
4.2 Neural Engine: Recognition dy-
namics with delayed gain modu-
lation
Using the statistical stimulus-response model of a
neural population defined in the previous section,
we now construct neural dynamics with time-delayed
modulation as a dynamic process of the Bayesian
inference, using time-varying β and α. The dyam-
ics reproduces the stimulus-response to which the
gain control is applied with time-delay as observed
in the experiment with attention tasks [42]. We then
explain how this cognitive dynamics constitutes an
information-theoretic engine [1, 2]. For this purpose,
we first introduce the conservation law for entropy of
neural activity.
Let the entropy of stimulus-response activity of a
neural popluation be
S = −
∑
x
q(x|Y) log q(x|Y). (13)
Entropy is dictated by the expected parameters U
and V as natural independent parameters. Its to-
tal derivative can be written as follows (see the next
section and references [1, 2, 25] for the derivation),
dS = βdU − αdV. (14)
This equation is a conservation law for entropy, and
explains how much the total entropy of a neural pop-
ulation changes by changing its internal or stimulus-
related activities. Eq. 14 posseses a mathematical
structure similar to the first law of thermodynam-
ics, the conservation law of energy. In thermody-
namics, the temperature T = 1/β is introduced as a
21The function shown in Fig. 6B is the response function
with respect to α. Similarly to this, we can realize the gain con-
trol of the response function with respect to the input stimulus
Y by controling β. In Reynolds et al.’s experiment [42], they
observed the input gain control even though the response did
not saturate at high contrast because they used non-optimal
stimuli. Therefore, we need to set the maximum activity rate
for each orientation to reproduce this phenomenon more pre-
cisely.
parameter to regulate the whole system by introduc-
ing α = βf , where f is known as a force applied to
the system. The conservation law is then written as
TdS = dU − fdV . The reason for represnting the
conservation in this form in thermodynamics is that
the system (gas) is controlled by the heat d¯Q = TdS
and the work d¯W = fdV . Here we do not intro-
duce the concepts of heat and work because we think
that the neural dynamics is controlled by β and α
(or the entropy of neural activity is controlled by
d¯Sint = βdU and d¯Sext = αdV ). Nevertheless, we
shall keep in mind that they share the same mathe-
matical structure.22 The reason why they share the
same mathmatical strucutre is because these distri-
butions are derived from the maximum entropy prin-
ciple (see next section). Following the first law of
thermodynamics, we call Eq. 14 the first law of
neurodynamics.
We now reproduce the cognitive dynamics with the
delayed modulation introduced in Section 3.2 using
the neural population defined in Section 4.1. To this
end, we introduce simple dynamics for the parameter
α, which regulates the stimulus-related feature, and
the parameter β, which regulates the internal fea-
tures (Fig. 7A). For the dynamics of α, in order to
imitate the stimulus-response, we adopted dynamics
that rapidly increases in the begening, followed by a
decay in longer time-scale (Fig. 7B).23
The parameter β responds slowly to this α.
Namely, the time constant τβ for the dynamics of
β is larger than the time constant τα for the dynam-
ics of α. Since the dynamics of the gain control is
slow, the initial response realizes β ≈ 1 and α ≈ 1,
at which the stimulus-response realizes nearly opti-
mal inference. Fig. 7C represents the activity rates
of neurons 1, 2, and 3. The solid line indicates the
activity rate with the delayed gain control, and the
dotted line is without the delayed gain control. Note
that for the parameters used in the simulation, the
smaller β is, the larger the internal activity. The ac-
tivity rate in the second half of the stimulus-response
22It should be noted that, by introducing α = βf , we can
use β and f as independent variables instead of β and α. With
these paramters, we can achieve the gain control by changing
β in which only the sensitivity (slope) is controlled without
shifting the response function horizontally (see Appendix). In
such a model of gain control, the concept of (inverse) tempera-
ture is valid because it regulates the stochasticity of the neural
response (see next section).
23We use the following dynamics in Fig. 7B [1, 2]
τ2αα˙(t) = −ταα(t) + s e−t/τα ,
τβ β˙(t) = −β(t) + β0 − γα(t),
where the parameters are set as τα = 0.05, τβ = 0.8, s = 2.7,
γ0 = 1, γ = 0.5.
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Figure 7: The information-theoretic engine realized by neural activity (neural engine). The number of
neurons and parameters of the features are the same as in Fig. 6. A A schematic diagram of the dynamics
of the parameter α that regulates the stimulus-related activity, and the parameter β that regulates the
spontaneous activity. B Dynamics of α and β. (α : thick solid line, β : thin solid line and dotted line)
C Activity rates of neurons 1, 2, and 3. The dotted line shows the case without the gain control, and the
solid line shows the case with the gain control with time-delay. The filled area is their difference. D Phase
diagram of the dynamics of the stimulus-response. The dotted line is without gain control. The cycle shown
by the solid line is with the delayed gain control. Left panel: U -β phase diagram. Right panel: V -α phase
diagram. E Left panel: U -β phase diagram drawn for dynamics in which β has a different time constant τβ .
The minimum value of β is fixed at 0.9. Right panel: The activity rates of neurons 1, 2, and 3 for different
time constants, τβ . The dotted line is the activity rate without the gain control. (inset) Entropic efficiency
at each time constant. The dotted line shows the maximum efficiency 0.1 realized with β = 0.9. Created
using the parameters given by the genearative model with reference to [1, 2] Fig. 2.
with the delayed gain control is uplifted compared to
the absence of the gain control.
Figure 7D displays the dynamics of this stimulus-
response in phase diagrams. The left panel shows
a U -β phase diagram. Since the internal activity
involves neurons 1, 2, and 3, the initial stimulus-
response of these neurons increases the internal ac-
tivity U that involves all neurons in the current def-
inition. U then decreases because the activity rates
of neurons 1, 2, and 3 fall. Since β is constant in the
absence of the delayed gain control, this dynamics
is represented by a line (Fig. 7D, Left panel, dotted
line). To the contrary, in the presence of the delayed
gain control, the dynamics draw a cycle in the U -β
phase diagram (Fig. 7D, Left panel, solid line). The
reason is that the value of β changes while U varies in
response to the stimulus. The panel on the right is a
V -α phase diagram. Similarly, the dynamics are rep-
resented by a line in the absence of the delayed gain
control (Fig. 7D, Right panel, dotted line), and the
dynamics draw a cycle in the presence of the delayed
gain control (Fig. 7D Right panel, solid line). By
applying the first law of neural dynamics (Eq. 14) to
this stimulus-response cycle, we obtain the following
equation:
0 =
∮
βdU −
∮
αdV. (15)
Note that entropy is a state variable. Since the states
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at the beginning and end of the cycle are the same,
the left side of the above equation is 0. On the other
hand, the first and second terms on the right-hand
side depend on the path of dynamics. The areas of the
cycles in Fig. 7D represent their magnitudes. Hence,
Eq. 15 states that the two cycles in the U -β phase
diagram and V -α phase diagram have equal size for
their areas.
One may consider that the size of the cycle quan-
tifies, by the measure of entropy, the degree of mod-
ulation applied to the stimulus-response caused by
the delayed gain control. In order to understand pre-
cisely what it means to have a large cycle as a neural
dynamics, let us consider the following cycles. Figure
7E (Left panel) shows a phase diagram of U -β when
the minimum value of the gain control parameter β,
which gives the maximum gain, is fixed at 0.9. It dis-
plays several dynamics with different time constants
τβ of β. The larger the time constant, the larger
the cycle. The reason is that β takes a value close
to 1 during the initial phase during which the inter-
nal activity increases, and β becomes less than one
during the phase in which the internal activity de-
creases, imposing the gain control. In this case, the
initial response is not uplifted very much, whereas the
response persists for a longer period during the de-
scending phase (Fig. 7E Right panel). Thus, the cycle
magnitude indicates how much the changes in the in-
ternal activity contributed to sustaining the stimulus-
response.
If the neural dynamics forms a cycle in the phase
diagram of U -β or V -α, this neural dynamics works
similarly to a heat engine in thermodynamics. In the
case of a heat engine, a heat bath supplies heat to
a gas, and then the gas emits the heat to a colder
heat bath. The energy difference is taken out as
the work. That is, the system produces the work
by taking advantage of the temperature difference.
Much in the same way, this neural dynamics acts as
an information-theoretic engine that converts entropy
changes due to the internal activity (the first term,
∆Sint =
∮
βdU) into entropy changes of the stimulus-
related activity (the second term, ∆Sext =
∮
αdV ).
The difference in the parameter β of the gain con-
trol causes the entropy change in the internal activ-
ity. We call the neural dynamics of stimulus-response
subject to the time-delayed modulation Neural En-
gine [1, 2].
Figure 8 shows schematic illustrations of the neural
engine. Let the internal activity at the stimulus onset
be Umin. We define ∆S
int
in as the change in entropy of
the neural activity (recognition model) caused by the
internal activity until U achieves the maximum Umax.
This entropy change is represented as the shaded area
Neural
Engine
 ΔS     ext
|ΔS    |intout
 ΔS    
int
in Entropy emission as
stimulus-related activity
0.95
1
Umin Umax
0
1
ΔS
ext
V
 ΔS    
int
in
A
B
Figure 8: Schematic diagrams of a neural engine. A
The difference between the increase in entropy of the
neural activity (in-flow) caused by the internal activ-
ity during the upward phase of the response ∆Sintin
and the decrease in entropy (out-flow) during the
downward phase |∆Sintout| is discharged as an entropy
change due to stimulus-related activity ∆Sext. B Left
panel: Entropy change by the internal activity. The
increase in entropy in the ascending phase ∆Sintin is
represented by sloping lines, and the decrease in en-
tropy in the descending phase |∆Sintout| is marked by
horizontal lines. Note that the sloping lines include
the area of the horizontal lines. The shaded area ex-
tends to β = 0 but is not shown. Right panel: Change
in entropy due to the stimulus-related activity, ∆Sext.
with sloping lines in the left panel of Figure 8B, which
is a positive value in this example. Next, let ∆Sintout
be the entropy change caused by the internal activity
when U returns to the level of spontaneous activity
from its maximum value. The sign of ∆Sintout is nega-
tive, and its magnitude is expressed as the area of the
horizontal lines in the figure. The area of the cycle is
computed as ∆Sint = ∆Sintin − |∆Sintout|. This area is
not zero if neurons experience the delayed gain con-
trol. In other words, changes in the internal activity
increase the entropy of neural activity during the ini-
tial response to a stimulus (ascending phase) and de-
crease the entropy in the descending phase, but their
magnitudes are different. As a result, a cycle of a
single stimulus-response increases entropy by ∆Sint.
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The excess entropy produced by the internal activity
is discharged as the entropy of the stimulus-related
activity ∆Sintout (Fig. 8, Right panel).
It should be noted that, in order for the neural
engine to emit the stimulus-related entropy, the fea-
ture for the internal activity H0(x) must have over-
lapping elements with the stimulus-related feature
H1(x) (i.e., neurons 1, 2, and 3 in this example), oth-
erwise β and α independently control distinct popula-
tions. In such case, the neural dyamics is once again
written by lines in the phase diagrams. It is this in-
teraction between the features that makes it possible
to realize the nonlinear gain control of the stimulus-
realted activity by the internal activity [2] (Fig. 6),
which results in exchange of the entropy when the
modulation is delayed.
The efficiency of retaining information can be
quantified in the same way as the thermal efficiency of
an engine. The following entropic efficiency was pro-
posed to measure how much of the entropy increased
by the internal activity during the initial response was
used to change the stimulus-related entropy [1, 2]:
η ≡ ∆S
ext
∆Sintin
= 1− |∆S
int
out|
∆Sintin
. (16)
We can consider the neural dynamics that yields
the largest cycle, given minimum and maximum val-
ues of β that provide maximum and minimum gain.
Figure 9 displays such a cycle. In this cycle, the
stimulus-response is not modulated until it reaches
its maximum value. Then the stimulus-response re-
ceives the maximum gain control after it starts to
decrease. In the U -β phase diagram, a rectangular
cycle represents such a dynamics (Fig. 9C). Since
the gain control does not contribute to increase the
initial response, rather, all of the gain modulation
caused by the change in β is used to prolong the
stimulus-response, we consider it to be the most effi-
cient dynamics retaining the stimulus-response. This
ideal cycle is an analogue of the Carnot cycle that
achieves the maximum thermal efficiency in thermo-
dynamics.24 The entropic efficiency of this ideal cycle
is
ηe = 1− |βL(Umin − Umax)|
βH(Umax − Umin) = 1−
βL
βH
. (17)
This entropic efficiency is determined only by β. Here
βH and βL are the β during the upward and down-
ward phase of the stimulus-response, respectively.
24The cycle that gives the highest entropic efficiency is not
identical to the Carnot cycle that gives the highest thermal
efficiency. The adiabatic processes in the Carnot cycle (dS =
0) is replaced with constant internal activity (dU = 0) in the
cycle that gives the maximum entropic efficiency. See [1, 2] for
the detailed description of this cycle.
We let βH = 1. The inset in the right panel of
Fig. 7D shows the entropic efficiency of the neural
engine with different time constants, τβ . As the β’s
time constant τβ increases, the efficiency of retaining
the stimulus information increases, and approaches
the upper limit of ηe = 1− 0.9/1 = 0.1.
In summary, we showed that the neural dynam-
ics that realizes the Bayesian inference constitutes an
information-theoretic engine when the stimulus in-
formation is modulated by the prior with time-delay.
Based on this paradigm, we introduced the method
for quantifying the amount of internal modulation to
keep the stimulus information, and calculating its ef-
ficiency.
4.3 The maximum entropy principle
for recognition and learning
Finally, we introduce an unified view on the recog-
nition and learning by extending the Bayesian infer-
ence under the maximum entropy principle. Follow-
ing this formulation, we introduce thermodynamic
approaches to treat the neural dynamics of recogni-
tion and learning, using the laws of entropy for neu-
ral activity [1, 2, 25]. More specifically, we derive the
first law of neural dynamics expressing the conserva-
tion law for the entropy of neural activity, and the
second law for learning.
We construct a recognition model q(x|Y) as a prob-
ability mass/density function with no structure other
than the ones made by the following constraints on
the prior and observation model,
〈− log p(x|w)〉 = U , (18)
〈− log p(Y|x,w)〉 = V. (19)
Here, 〈·〉 represents expectation by q(x), and U and
V are the expected values.25 This is an entropy max-
imization problem with constraints. We can solve
this problem by the method of Lagrange multipliers
to minimize the following functional G:
G[q] = −S + β〈− log p(x|w)〉+ α〈− log p(Y|x,w)〉,
(20)
where S is the entropy of the recognition model
(Eq. 13). β and α are constants called the Lagrange
multipliers. They are chosen to satisfy the constraints
given by Eqs. 18 and 19. In terms of G, these con-
25Note that definitions of U and V are different from U and
V in the previous section. U and V include constant terms not
related to x. Also, note that the definitions of V and V have
opposite signs with respect to the stimulus-related feature.
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Figure 9: The neural engine that achieves the highest entropic efficiency. The number of neurons and
parameters for features are the same as in Fig. 6. A Top panel: Exemplary spiking activity of 5 neurons.
Lower panel: activity rates of neurons. B V -α phase diagram. C U -β phase diagram. D Fluctuation of the
neuronal population. Left panel: Fluctuation of the entire system (heat capacity). Right panel: Fluctuation
of the stimulus-related activity (Fisher information about α).
straints are expressed as the following formula:
∂G
∂β
= U , (21)
∂G
∂α
= V. (22)
In the following, we call G free energy, and consider
the problem of minimizing the free energy.
The probability mass/density function q(x|Y) that
minimizes the free energy G is given as the one that
makes the following variation of G equals to zero,
δG[q] =
∫
δq(x|Y)[1 + log q(x)− β log p(x|w)
− α log p(Y|x,w)] dx. (23)
Threfore, we obtain [25]
q(x|Y) = 1Zβ,α(Y)e
β log p(x|w)+α log p(Y|x,w). (24)
Here we additionally constrained the function to be
the probability density by introducing the normaliza-
tion function, Zβ,α:
Zβ,α(Y) =
∑
x
eβ log p(x|w)+α log p(Y|x,w). (25)
Note that this function is also called the partition
function, and becomes the marginal likelihood func-
tion at β = 1 and α = 1: Zβ=1,α=1 = p(Y|w). Since
the above probability mass/density function was de-
rived under the maxium entropy principle, it is called
the maximum entropy model.
The recognition model obtained by the maximum
entropy principle (Eq. 24) extends the Bayesian for-
mula, where β and α represent weights of the prior
and observation models in constructing the approx-
imate posterior distribution. For example, we may
employ a Gaussian distribution with the covariance
matrix Σ as the observation model (Eq. 6), and
the Ising model (Eq. 7) with the parameter Ω as
a prior distribution. Then the maximum entropy
model (Eq. 24) becomes the recognition model used
to construct the neural engine in the previous section
(Eq. 9) (but with a different normalization term).26
26In the recognition model used in the previous section, we
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Thus, to repeat the previous section, if β = 1 and
α = 1, this recognition model is an exact posterior
distribution. If β = 1 and α = 0, it represents a
spontaneous activity. Hence, the dynamics forming
the optimal inference from the spontaneous activity
during the stimulus presentation is realized by chang-
ing α from 0 to 1 under β = 1.
From Eq. 13, the entropy for the maximum entropy
model (Eq. 24) is given as
S = β〈− log p(x|w)〉+ α〈− log p(Y|x,w)〉
+ logZβ,α(Y). (26)
Thus, by inserting the above into the equation of the
free energy (Eq. 20), we obtain
G(β, α) = − logZβ,α(Y). (27)
That is, the free energy of the maximum entropy
model obtained under the constraints (Eq. 24) is
given as the negative logarithm of its normalization
(partition function) of the probability function. Note
that the free energy G is no longer a functional be-
cause we specified the exponential form of the recog-
nition model. Hence we represent it as a function
with respect to the parameters of the recognition
model, β and α. Here we call G(β, α) as the Gibbs
free energy Further, from Eqs. 21 and 22, the total
derivative of G(β, α) becomes
dG(β, α) =
(
∂G
∂β
)
α
dβ +
(
∂G
∂α
)
β
dα
= Udβ + Vdα. (28)
The learning of the external world by the genera-
tive model is achieved by changing the parameters w
of the prior and observation model to maximize the
marginal likelihood function. We note that the par-
tition function Zβ,α(Y) becomes the marginal like-
lihood function at β = 1 and α = 1. Therefore,
used the Gaussian distribution with the covariance matrix αΣ
as the observation model (Eq. 6) and the Ising model with the
parameter βΩ as a prior distribution (Eq. 7). The scaling pa-
rameters β and α in the observation model and prior distribu-
tion are the linear parameters of the features (functions of x).
We can take such parameters out of the observation and prior
models, and treat them as linear weights of the standardized
observation and prior models in the maximum entropy model.
In general, if we use generalized linear models for the observa-
tion model and prior distribution, we may handle their linear
parameters in the same way. However, the constant terms
in the features that do not relate to x are different in these
two approaches. For example, we have βψ(Ω) as a constant
term unrelated to x in the maximum entropy model (Eq. 24),
whereas we obtain ψ(βΩ) as the constant term in the recogni-
tion model used in the previous section (Eq. 9). The difference
in these terms does not affect the distribution, but results in
different normalization terms.
decreasing the Gibbs free energy under the optimal
inference is equivalent to learning according to max-
imization of the log marginal likelihood. We can ex-
press the dynamics of learning as follows.
dw
dt
= −∂G(β, α)
∂w
, (29)
where  is a positive learning coefficient, and we im-
pose that the learning carried out only if the param-
eters β and α take in the vicinity of β = 1 and α = 1.
Here we note that Eq. 28 dictates how the Gibbs free
energy changes by changing the parameters, β and
α, but does not include contributions by changing w.
Thus, if the learning following Eq. 29 takes place, we
expect
dG(β, α) ≤ Udβ + Vdα. (30)
In particular, if the learning takes place while the
parameters β and α are fixed, we observe the contri-
butions caused by the learning only: dG ≤ 0.
Finally, we derive the conservation law for the en-
tropy of neural activity, and show that decreasing
the Gibbs free energy by learning is equivalent to in-
creasing the entropy. From Eq. 26, the entropy of the
recognition model is obtained as
S(U ,V) = βU + αV − G(β, α). (31)
The total derivative of the entropy is given as
dS(U ,V) = d(βU + αV)− dG(β, α)
= (βdU + Udβ) + (αdV + Vdα)
− dG(β, α). (32)
We obtain the following euqaiton by inserting the to-
tal derivative of the Gibbs free energy (Eq. 28) to this
equation,
dS = βdU + αdV. (33)
This is the first law of neural dynamics when we use
the maximum entropy model as the neural activity.
As mentioned in the previous section, it contains the
same mathematical structure as the first law of ther-
modynamics that represents the conservation of heat
and energy. For example, we can rewrite α as α = βf
by introducing a parameter f known as a force, and
consider β and f (rather than β and α) to be indepen-
dent parameters. In this case, β is a parameter that
controls both the prior and the observation model
simultaneously. The parameter β is then a natural
parameter dually to the expected value, E = U + fV,
and becomes an analog of the inverse temperature
that controls the energy of the system in thermody-
namics. It is possible to consider the gain control
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by such β that results in neurons’ sensitivity change
(see Appendix); however, in this article, we discussed
the neural dynamics represented by β and α as its
independent variables.
Next, if we apply the inequaility (Eq. 30) obtained
under the learning to Eq. 32, we obtain
dS ≥ βdU + αdV. (34)
In particular, given that we fix β and α (U and V ),
this inequality represents the law of increasing en-
tropy: dS ≥ 0. That is, learning that follows the
marginal likelihood maximization results in an in-
crease in the entropy of neural activity. Following the
second law of thermodynamics, we call this law the
second law of neurodynamics.27 However, sim-
ply increasing the entropy of the recognition model
or decreasing Gibbs free energy is not sufficient for
learning. Rather, the organism needs to make opti-
mal inference as much as possible by constructing a
distribution close to the exact posterior distribution
achieved at β = 1 and α = 1.28
In this section, we introdced an extended frame-
work of the Bayes’ formula that integrates the prior
distribution and observation model based on the
maximum entropy principle, and derived laws for en-
tropy on the dynamics of organism’s learning and
recognition.
5 Summary and prospects
This article explained the dynamics of organisms’
learning and recognition from the perspectives of the
Bayesian inference and thermodynamics. Based on
the experiments suggesting that the brain acquires
a generative model of the world and the experi-
ments revealing the temporal structure of recogni-
tion dynamics in living organisms, we modeled the
stimulus-response activity of a spiking neural popu-
lation that dynamically performs the Bayesian infer-
ence. We then explained the thermodynamic view of
the Bayesian brain, introducing the laws for entropy
of neural dynamics. Notably, neural activity oper-
ates as an information-theoretic engine (neural en-
gine) when the stimulus information is modulated by
the delayed gain control. In the following, we discuss
27Note that here we consider a quasistatic process. If we
consider the irrevasible neural dyanmics expected for history-
dependent models, we additionally obtain the entropy produc-
tion caused by the causal effects [72, 73].
28The situation is the same as in the Expectation-
Maximization alogrithm of machine learning. The parameter
optimization (M-step) must come with the optimal inference
(E-step). Otherwise, the difference between the marginal like-
lihood and its lower bound diverges.
the mertis of treating the brain as the information-
theoretic engine, and introduce the analysis frame-
work to test the hypothesis from observed spiking
data.
Utilities of the delayed gain control What are
the benefits of the delayed gain control for organisms’
learning and recognition? One feature of the delayed
gain control is to keep the effect of the stimulus-
response longer without excessively increasing the
maximum values of the firing rates (See Fig. 7E).
It was the entropic efficiency that quantified this fea-
ture: The cycle with the highest entropic efficiency
prolongs the stimulus-response without changing the
maximum firing rates of neurons (Fig. 9). Such neu-
ral activity has a clear biological benefit. By avoid-
ing intensive firing happening in a short time, the
network activity avoids undergoing an inactive state
caused by synaptic depression (for example, due to
depletion of synaptic vesicles or sensitization of re-
ceptors to ligands) [74]. It also has merits in infer-
ence and learning. With such dynamics, the network
can construct a nearly optimal posterior distribution
at an initial response, which allows the organisms to
make an appropriate inference (Fig. 8B). The con-
textual information modulates the stimulus-response
only after the networks made the optimal inference
about the stimulus. As shown in Section 4.3, learn-
ing needs to take place under the optimal posterior
distribution. If biological learning based on neural
spikes occurs when the neural system is highly active
as expected for the long-term potentiation (LTP) or
spike-timing-dependent plasticity (STDP), then the
appropriate learning can naturally take place by the
presence of this unbiased initial response.
Hierarchy of temporal scales and its mecha-
nism The delayed gain control prolongs the stimulus-
evoked activity in the early sensory areas. We may
say that the early sensory cortex, which operates on
a relatively fast time-scale, retains the sensory in-
formation for a more extended period with the help
of the higher cortical areas that operate on a longer
time-scale. Is such a temporal hierarchy observed
in the brains? Ogawa et al. investigated the dif-
ference in time-scales between the area V4 and the
frontal eye field (FEF), and found that the intrin-
sic time-scale of FEF is much longer than that of
V4 [75]. They also pointed out that representations
of V4 neurons dynamically change from visual fea-
tures to behaviorally-relevant features, and that this
may be caused by modulation by the feedback in-
put from FEF [76]. Murray et al. reported that the
intrinsic time-scale of cortical spiking activity slows
down from the sensory cortex to the prefrontal cor-
tex [77]. In this study, they examined the intrinsic
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time-scales of six different cortical areas using the de-
cay time of autocorrelation functions for spike counts
during pre-trial periods. They found the intrinsic
time-scale slows down from the sensory areas (MT,
S1/S2) to the prefrontal area (LIP, LPFC, ACC) in
the range of 50ms to 350 ms, where they observed
the most extended time-scale at the anterior cingulate
cortex (ACC). They also found a positive correlation
between the time-scale of reward-induced firing-rate
modulation and intrinsic time-scale in the prefrontal
cortex, suggesting that the intrinsic time-scale is the
basis of the dynamics of task-dependent neural activ-
ity. Although further experimental studies are ness-
esary to uncover the temporal hierachy in the brain,
these studies support that the feedback inputs from
higher cortical areas, in general, can exhibit longer
time-scales.29
Each cortical area in the brain is characterized
by distinct network architecture and cytoarchitec-
ture defined by cell size, density, and layer structure.
These architectural differences are thought to under-
lie the different time-scales and firing characteristics
of cortical neurons [77, 79]. For example, the series
of histological studies by Elston and colleagues re-
vealed that, in monkeys and humans, the dendrites
of pyramidal cells extend wider spatial areas as we
move from the visual to prefrontal cortices, and the
spine density on the dendrites also increases along
the pathway [80, 81, 82]. Thus, they suggested that
the neurons in the higher-order cortical areas inte-
grate information more intensively than the neurons
in early visual areas. Researchers argued that such
differences in cellular architecture and morphology
are behind the hierarchical time-scales in neural infor-
mation processing, and that the fast time-scale of the
visual cortex may be better suited to process rapidly
changing visual stimuli [82, 83, 77].
Integrating the dynamics with different
time-scales The critical prerequisite that makes
neural activity constitute the information-theoretic
engine is the integration of dynamics operating with
different time-scales. In this article, we provided sig-
nificantly simplified neural dynamics governed by just
two parameters with fast and slow time-scales for the
observation and prior, to illustrate how neurons can
dynamically realize the Bayesian inference. However,
we cannot expect the two parameters to represent the
actual activity of a neural population. We need ad-
29From the perspective of adaptive systems, it is conceiv-
able that the brain developed the intrinsic temporal hierarchy
to capture a temporal hierarchy existing in natural stimuli.
However, it will not be easy to test this idea empirically. As
a constructive approach, researchers are studying whether re-
current neural networks with multiple intrinsic time-scales can
acquire temporally hierarchical contexts [78].
vanced statistical modeling methods to analyze em-
pirically observed stimulus-evoked activity (see below
for data analysis methods).
Moreover, it is not necessary to integrate observa-
tions and prior distributions with time-delay to con-
stitute a narrowly-defined information-theoretic en-
gine. For example, in Section 4.2, we assumed the
same time-scale for the activity rates of the three neu-
rons encoding the stimulus. However, these neurons
may respond to a stimulus with unique time-scales.
In this case, the dynamics forms a cycle in the phase
space without modulation caused by a change in the
prior distribution. Nevertheless, the total entropy
emission from the internal activity is zero. When
quantifying the delayed modulation caused by aware-
ness or attention, it would be important to assess
if the cycle of stimulus-response increases by such
a factor, resulting in larger entropy emission of the
stimulus-related activity.
Analysis of emprical data The neural engine
offers a way to assess a magnitude of the delayed
modulation on neural activity thought to be involved
in perceptual experience. Although modulation ef-
fects may be seen in the firing rates of individual
neurons as reported in the literature, the view as
a neural engine allows us to quantify its magnitude
by entropy, a scalar macroscopic value of the sys-
tem, while taking neurons’ correlations into account.
The question is then whether we can fit the Ising
model to the observed time-series of spike data dur-
ing the stimulus-response activity. More specifically,
can we estimate dynamics of the time-varying distri-
bution of the neural spiking activity expected during
stimulus presentation, and quantify the system us-
ing the change of entropy? For this goal, the author
and colleagues have been developing the state-space
Ising models and its estimation method over the past
decade [84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89] (Fig. 10).
In the state-space Ising model, we assume that the
parameters of the Ising model (see Eq. 7) varies in
time. The framework of data anlysis with this model
is based on the sequential Bayesian algorithm for esti-
mating the time-dependent Ising parameters and op-
timization of hyperparameters that dictate dynamics
of the parameters. The method makes it possible to
trace the dynamics of interactions between neurons,
taking into account the time-dependent firing rates
of individual neurons (Fig. 10A, B). In addition, the
method allows us to visualize the dynamics of macro-
scopic quantities of the system such as free energy,
entropy, entropy related to correlated activities, heat
capacity expressing system’s fluctuation (Fig. 10C).
In general, the computational complexity in ana-
lyzing the patterns of population activity increases
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Figure 10: Analysis of the stimulus-evoked activity of monkey V1 neurons using a state-space Ising model.
A Top: Simultaneously recorded spike sequences of 45 neurons when a grating stimulus is presented. Bot-
tom: Average firing probability of all neurons (data in black, model fit in green). The gray area indicates
the period of stimulus presentation. B Top: A snapshot of the parameters of the estimated Ising model.
Bottom: mean and standard deviation of the estimated parameters. C Dynamics of estimated thermody-
namic quantities. From top to bottom: The credible intervals of probability of simultaneous silence, entropy,
entropy ratio for pairwise correlations, and heat capacity. The darker credible intervals are the results of
uncorrelated surrogate data obtained by trial shuffling. CC-BY Christian Donner, Klaus Obermayer, and
Hideaki Shimazaki. Approximate inference for time-varying interactions and macroscopic dynamics of neural
populations. PLoS computational biology, 13(1):e1005309, 2017.
exponentially as the number of neurons increases.
Analysis using the Ising model is no exception. How-
ever, many approximation methods have been devel-
oped for this classical model, including the pseudo-
likelihood, mean-field, and Bethe approximations.
By incorporating these methods into the state-space
model, we estimated the parameters of a relatively
large number of neurons (≈50) and estimate the
macroscopic quantities that characterize the system
[87]. Further, using the model of neural activity
shown in Eq. 10, Gaudreault et al. proposed a
method to estimate the time-dependent natural pa-
rameters while simultaneously learning the param-
eters of features [89]. Based on these recent ada-
vances of the state-space Ising models, it is, in prin-
ciple, possible to statistically fit the neural activity
to the model of a neural engine to quantify the effect
of feedback modulation, and relate it to perceptual
experiences of animals.
Quantifying consciousness Is it possible to
quantify consciousness by treating the brain as an
information-theoretic engine? The entropy measure
of the neural engine quantifies the retention of the
stimulus information by the delayed gain control.
The key factors underpinning this measure are a neu-
ron’s nonlinear response function (the basis of neural
computation), the gain control using the nonlinearity
(information integration), and recurrent inputs with
a time-delay. Can we quantify consciousness with
such a simple metric? Whether this is a reasonable
measure depends on how much these underlying neu-
ronal mechanisms are involved in conscious experi-
ences, and, as a result, how closely the late compo-
nent of stimulus-response activity is related to the
conscious experiences or the level of consciousness of
human subjects [90, 91].
There are a handful of human studies on this is-
sue with invasive electrophysiological recordings, but
these supported the close relationship. Libet et al.
examined subdural electrode recordings in the hu-
man somatosensory cortex and found that the initial
response component was insufficient for a conscious
experience of a tactile stimulus. They reported that
the presence or absence of the subsequent late com-
ponent correlated with the conscious experience [92].
The temporal characteristics of the disappearance of
conscious experience by backward masking (in par-
ticular by common-onset masking) [93, 94] or tran-
23
REFERENCES
scranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) [95] for humans
also suggest that the late component is involved in
the conscious experience.
Neural signals measured from humans often take
the form of continuous signals such as EEG record-
ings or fMRI data with a few exceptions of electro-
physiological recordings of spikes from patients with
epilepsy. However, assessment of the neural signals as
an information-theoretic engine is not limited to the
model for time-series of spike trains discussed in this
article. Instead, it can be constructed using models
following an exponential family distribution. There-
fore, it would be possible to assess if the EEG or fMRI
signals recorded from humans works as a neural en-
gine, and test if the late component of the stimulus-
response is closely related to conscious experiences of
humans, using the suggested entropy measure. More
precisely, the locus ceruleus-norepinephrine (LC-NE)
system is thought to regulate the level of animal’s
arousal, and it was suggested that activation of the
LC-NE system acts as a brain-wide gain modulation
[96, 97, 98]. Since the LC activity is tightly correlated
with pupil diameters [96, 99], it will be an important
topic to study the relation between changes in pupil
diameters and the suggested entropy measure for the
delayed modulation, togather with subjective reports
on the conscious experiences.
This article explained the neural dynamics of learn-
ing and recognition from the perspectives of the
Bayesian inference and thermodynamics. We demon-
strated that the stimulus-response subject to the de-
layed gain control is described as the dynamics of
the Bayesian inference. We further introduced the
thermodynamic view on this process. When the
gain control takes place to integrate neural dynam-
ics with various time-scales, the brain works as an
information-theoretic engine. This new paradigm
offers a unified computational and statistical view
on the neural dynamics, providing quantative ap-
proaches to assess the organism’s perceptual capacity
from neural signals.
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Appendix: The nonlinear response
function, gain control, and generative
model
In this Appendix, we describe stimulus-evoked activ-
ity and the gain control using a generative model that
is made of a population of independent neurons. Let
N be the number of neurons, and xi (i = 1, . . . , N)
be a binary variable taking 1 and 0, where 1 denotes
spiking and 0 denotes no spikes. The probability that
xi becomes 1 is given by ηi. Hence the probability
that xi becomes 0 is given by 1− ηi. We model how
ηi, the expectation of xi, changes according to an
external stimulus.
Let the stimulus presented to the animal be Y.
In the case of visual stimuli, Y is a column vector
(d × 1) of the pixel intensities of a grayscale image.
We represent the expected value ηi of the ith neu-
ronal activity by the nonlinear response function to
the input stimulus, ηi = fi(Y). For a binary ran-
dom variable, the range must be restricted within 0
and 1. The function fi(Y) may be acquired through
learning, but here we consider a logistic function as
a nonlinear response function:
fi(Y) =
1
1 + e−(ϕi0+Y′ϕi)
, (35)
where ϕi is a d-dimensional column vector that rep-
resents a receptive field of the ith neuron. ϕi0 is a
bias parameter, and adjusting this parameter results
in the gain control. µi = ϕi0 + Y
′ϕi is called a linear
predictor.
The motivation to choose the logistic function as
a response function does not come from biological
plausibility but rather comes from its simplicity in
statitical modeling, which originates from our choice
of the Kullback-Leibler divergence as a metric for the
probability space. The probability distribution of in-
dependent neurons is represented by the product of
Bernoulli distributions:
p(x|Y) =
N∏
i=1
ηxii (1− ηi)1−xi
=
N∏
i=1
exp[log
ηi
1− ηi · xi + log(1− ηi)]. (36)
Based on the second equality, the Bernoulli distri-
bution representing the ith neuronal activity belongs
to an exponential familiy distribution: f(xi | ηi) =
h(xi) exp [θi(ηi) · T (xi)−A(ηi)]. Here θi is a lin-
ear parameter with respect to the feature T (xi),
and we call them as natural/canonical parameters.
In the case of a Bernoulli distribution, we obtain
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θi(ηi) = log ηi/(1− ηi), which is called the logit func-
tion. The logit function is a natural link function of
the Bernoulli distribution. Since the inverse of the
logit function is a logistic function, θi is the linear
predictor µi. That is, if we represent the activity of
independent neuronal populations as an exponential
family distribution, we obtain
p(x|Y) =
N∏
i=1
exp[(ϕi0 + Y
′ϕi)xi
− log(1 + eβ(ϕi0+Y′ϕi))]. (37)
This equaition is seen as a regression of data on neu-
ronal activity using a generalized linear model with a
logit link function.
Next, we use the generative model to construct a
posterior distribution of neural activity to represent
the responses of the independent neurons described
above. By doing so, we elucidate the relationship of
the response function and its gain control with the
generative model. First, we consider an independent
Bernoulli distribution as a prior of the neural activity.
pβ(x|ω) =
N∏
i=1
eβωix−log(1+e
βωi ). (38)
Namely, the activity rate of the ith neuron is given
as 1/(1 + e−βωi) under this prior distribution. β is
a parameter that is common to all neurons. Next,
we consider the observation model using a normal
distribution.
pα(Y|x,Φ) =
( α
2pi
)1/2
e−
α
2 (Y−Φx)′(Y−Φx). (39)
Here, for simplicity, we used a diagonal matrix as a
covariance matrix whose variance is given by α−1.
Φ = [φ1,φ2, . . . ,φN ] is a d×N dimensional matrix.
The ith colmun φi is a d-dimensional column vector,
representing a stimulus by the ith neuron. It is called
a basis vector or projection field. Here we assume
that the basis vectors are orthogonal to each other,
and their norm is 1: Φ′Φ = I.
The posterior distribution based on the generative
model consisting of the prior distribution and obser-
vation model is expressed as follows.
pβ,α(x|Y,ω,Φ) = pβ(x|ω)pα(Y|x,Φ)
pβ,α(Y|ω,Φ)
∝ exp
[
β
N∑
i=1
ωixi − α
2
(Y −Φx)′(Y −Φx)
]
∝ exp
[
β
N∑
i=1
ωixi + αY
′Φx− α
2
x′Φ′Φx
]
∝
N∏
i=1
exp
[
(βωi − α
2
+ αY′φi)xi
]
. (40)
Here we used x′Φ′Φx = x′x =
∑N
i=1 x
2
i =
∑N
i=1 xi.
If we compare the neural activity derived as a pos-
terior distribution (Eq.40) with the neural activity
derived from the response function (Eq. 37), we find
that the posterior distribution follows the Bernoulli
distribution whose expectation is given by the lo-
gistic response function, where the receptive field is
ϕi = αφi, and a bias term is ϕi0 = βωi−α/2 (Eq.35).
Thus, changes in the parameters of the prior distri-
bution, βωi, modifies the bias term ϕi0, which results
in the gain control of the stimulus-reponse function.
In sum, using a generative model, we can model the
stochastic neural activity that follows the logistic re-
sponse function, and changes in the prior distribution
can lead to the adaptation by the gain control.
Further, if we define α = βf by introducing a new
independent parameter f , then β becomes a param-
eter that controls the prior and observation model
simultaneously. In this case, we have
pβ,α(x|Y,ω,Φ)
∝
N∏
i=1
exp
[
β(ωi − f
2
+ fY′φi)xi
]
. (41)
Hence, by letting the bias term be ϕi0 = ωi−f/2 and
the receptive field be ϕi = fφi, the expected activity
rate of the ith neuron is given as
fi(Y) =
1
1 + e−β(ϕi0+Y′ϕi)
. (42)
In this case, β becomes the parameter that deter-
mines the slope of the curve of the logistic function.
The higher the absolute value of β, the steeper the
function becomes around µi = 0. Thus, by changing
β we can achieve the gain control that changes only
the sensitivity of the response function to the stim-
ulus without shifting the response function horizon-
tally. This is a different type of gain control than that
realized by changing the bias term, and can control
the stochasticity of the response (For example, the
response is deterministic if β = ∞, and random if
β = 0). Therefore, β works analogouly to an inverse
temperature of statistical physics.
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